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Background: Prioritising scarce resources for investment in innovation by publically funded health systems is
unavoidable. Many healthcare systems wish to foster transparency and accountability in the decisions they make by
incorporating the public in decision-making processes. This paper presents a unique conceptual approach exploring
the public’s preferences for health service innovations by viewing healthcare innovations as ‘bundles’ of characteristics.
This decompositional approach allows policy-makers to compare numerous competing health service innovations
without repeatedly administering surveys for specific innovation choices.
Methods: A Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) was used to elicit preferences. Individuals chose from presented
innovation options that they believe the UK National Health Service (NHS) should invest the most in. Innovations differed
according to: (i) target population; (ii) target age; (iii) implementation time; (iv) uncertainty associated with their likely
effects; (v) potential health benefits; and, (vi) cost to a taxpayer. This approach fosters multidimensional decision-making,
rather than imposing a single decision criterion (e.g., cost, target age) in prioritisation. Choice data was then analysed
using scale-adjusted Latent Class models to investigate variability in preferences and scale and valuations amongst
respondents.
Results: Three latent classes with considerable heterogeneity in the preferences were present. Each latent class
is composed of two consumer subgroups varying in the level of certainty in their choices. All groups preferred
scientifically proven innovations, those with potential health benefits that cost less. There were, however, some
important differences in their preferences for innovation investment choices: Class-1 (54%) prefers innovations
benefitting adults and young people and does not prefer innovations targeting people with ‘drug addiction’
and ‘obesity’. Class- 2 (34%) prefers innovations targeting ‘cancer’ patients only and has negative preferences for
innovations targeting elderly, and Class-3 (12%) prefers spending on elderly and cancer patients the most.
Conclusions: DCE can help policy-makers incorporate public preferences for health service innovation investment choices
into decision making. The findings provide useful information on the public’s valuation and acceptability of potential health
service innovations. Such information can be used to guide innovation prioritisation decisions by comparing competing
innovation options. The approach in this paper makes, these often implicit and opaque decisions, more transparent
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Innovations – products, practices, methods or services
that are perceived as “new” by adopters and potential
users [1] – come in various forms. In systems where
the number of innovations that can be implemented
outstrips scarce resources, prioritisation surrounding
which health service innovations receive resources is
inevitable [2,3]. Alongside the use of economic criteria
(e.g., cost-effectiveness, cost-utility), other factors,
such as ease of implementation, severity of disease,
and political acceptability [4] are also used in the
prioritisation of health service innovations, often
implicitly. Recently, health systems have sought to in-
corporate public preferences in priority setting and in-
vestment decisions [5-9].
Studies examining the public’s priorities for spending
on healthcare often focus on criteria such as ‘severity of
illness’ [10,11] ‘age’ [12], and ‘value for money’ [10].
Often these criteria are viewed in isolation from each
other. In this paper, we start from a descriptive position
that innovation investment prioritisation decisions are
complex and a normative position that they should be
based on multiple criteria; in doing so, we propose a
means of identifying the importance attached to such
criteria. We use the term ‘characteristic’ to represent
such criteria. Every innovation has several such charac-
teristics: how much it costs, the health benefits likely to
result from implementation, the population targeted or
most affected. In this paper, we explore the acceptability
of (and importance attached to) health service innova-
tions and their characteristics from a social perspective.
We aim to explain how valuation of innovation charac-
teristics can be meaningfully used as a guide for priori-
tisation and innovation investment. Crucially, we want
to fill one of the important gaps in the innovation imple-
mentation literature: how the public feel about potential
choices made on their behalf.
Our methodological approach, Discrete Choice Ex-
periments (DCE), involves viewing healthcare innova-
tions as ‘bundles’ of characteristics (e.g., their cost,
how long they take to implement, and their likely im-
pact on health), which allows us to study a wide range
of innovations sharing the same characteristics (e.g.,
cost), but at different levels (e.g., £10, £20), without
specifying exactly what these innovations are. By using
this broader framework, we aim to help policy-makers
and other decision-makers in prioritising the innovation
investment choices available to them. Additionally,
whilst DCE is receiving growing attention in health eco-
nomics [13-16], its use in an implementation (of innova-
tions) context is sparse [10,11,13]. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first empirical study to explore
public preferences for health service innovation invest-
ment options.Methods
Discrete choice experiments (DCE)
The Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) is a technique
for eliciting individuals’ preferences. It is commonly used
in environmental economics [17-19] and transportation
[20-22] for prioritisation decisions using public prefer-
ences. Health economists have begun to see the benefit
of the approach for helping answer a wide range of pol-
icy questions [13,23], including priority setting frame-
works [2,10,24-27].
DCE involves asking respondents to choose between
competing (hypothetical) innovations, presented as sce-
narios, using a series of defined characteristics (or attri-
butes) represented at various levels (e.g., an attribute of
‘financial cost’ at the level of ‘£10’). Using the choice
data, the relative importance of specific, plausible sce-
narios, and the values individuals attach to their con-
stituent parts (i.e., willingness-to-pay) are estimated via
probabilistic choice models [28,29].
Attribute and level selection
Attributes and their associated levels were identified
from literature reviews and policy documents (e.g., NICE
[30]), interviews with Foundation Trust managers and
Trust members, and a focus group discussion with non-
academic staff in Yorka. Innovation characteristics from
these sources were compiled and refined using inter-
views with managers from a large NHS Foundation
Trust. The final selection of characteristics to be used in
the survey is based on the focus group discussions and
discussions with managers from a NHS Foundation
Trust. As a result, we used six health service innovation
attributes in the surveys: (i) target population; (ii) age
group; (iii) time to get into practice; (iv) whether it
works; (v) potential health benefits; and, (vi) cost to an
individual taxpayer. The detailed descriptions are pre-
sented in Table 1. The survey attributes, the number of
choice tasks, and survey question framing were further
tested using two pilot surveysb. The pilot surveys yielded
data that could be used to identify confusions, lack of
understanding, and the time needed to complete the
survey. They also tested the framing of the informa-
tion, which is provided to respondents before they took
the survey, about innovations, innovation characteris-
tics and levels. The study was approved by the Health
Sciences Ethics and Governance Committee of the
University of York.
Various reasons lay behind the final selection of these
attributes. Different health issues differentially impact on
certain population and age groups. Thus, expressed need
with potential for improved health between groups may
also be different [31]; as will their capacity to benefit
[30], p.47]. Age is a contentious decision criterion for
health service prioritisation [32-34]. We included ‘age’ to
Table 1 Health service innovation attributes and levels
Attribute Levels
Target population People with disability
People with cancer
People with mental health problems
People with obesity
People with asthma
People with drug addictions
Age group Young (less than 18)
Adults (18–65)
Elderly (more than 65)
Time to get into practice 0–5 months
6–12 months
More than 12 months
Whether it works It works and scientific studies confirm this
It works but not scientifically proven
Experts say it works elsewhere in the NHS
Potential health benefit/gain Best health (100%)
Good health (75%)
Moderate health (50%)
Cost to you as a taxpayer
(£/month)
£10, £20, £30, and £40
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established, there are systematic differences in the pub-
lic’s preferences for innovations targeting certain age
groups.
Time to get the innovation adopted into practice dif-
fers between units of adoption (e.g., small teams or large
organisations) [35]. It might also depend on innovation
type; some innovations may be more complex, requiring
a longer time to be implemented, others may require
additional time for training. However, the quicker an
innovation is adopted the sooner the public will be
exposed to its assumed benefits. Thus, we wanted to
explore whether the public would be willing to trade off
potential health benefits in three time-periods –
described as realistic by an NHS management team,
(0–5 months, 6–12 months, and more than a year).
The strength of the evidence underpinning effective-
ness is a determinant of innovation diffusion and adop-
tion [36,37]. We described the evidence on innovation
effectiveness using an approach akin to Farrar et al. [38]
and Cunningham et al. [39]: three levels, with differing
levels of certainty and strength (inferred from an accom-
panying information source).
The potential health gain generated by an innovation
is also an important factor for decision-makers when
prioritising innovations for implementation [10,40,41].
There is strong evidence that health gain also matters to
the public judging the allocation of healthcare resources[34,42,43]. However, measuring health gain is challen-
ging as information on those that benefit most from an
innovation, and how much benefit will accrue, is often
absent. Green and Gerard [10] overcome this limitation
by using qualitative categories of changes in health (e.g.,
small, medium and large gains); an approach that leaves
open the possibility that people will interpret categories
differently. Quantitative approaches (e.g., Quality Ad-
justed Life Years gained or number of patients treated)
have also been used in priority setting [40,44]. However,
the lack of reliable data, difficulty in generalising to fu-
ture applications, and explaining quantitative measures
to a society which some commentators claim is func-
tionally ‘innumerate’ [45] remain considerable barriers
to popular use. We quantified potential change in health
status using a multi-attribute health status classification
system, EQ-5D [46] and presented it using a visual
‘health status scale’, as shown in Figure 1.
EQ-5D has five dimensions; mobility, self-care, usual
activities, pain/discomfort, and anxiety/depression. Each
dimension has three levels; no problem, some problems,
and extreme problems, resulting in 243 ‘scored’ health
states. For example, perfect health (no problems on any
dimensions) would result in a score of 100 (20 in each
dimension). Conversely, death (more detail on different
states and scores can be found in EuroQol [46]) would
be represented by a score of 0. We needed to select a
feasible number of heath states (attributes) from the 243
possibilities. These needed to be realistic, clearly under-
stood by respondents and easily discriminated. Small dif-
ferences in scores were unlikely to meet these criteria
and so we selected four health states – worst health
(score 0), moderate health (score 50), good health (score
75), and best health (score 100), labelled ‘common core’
health states (EuroQol [46], p.31). Our pilot surveys
showed these four health states were easy to understand
and differentiate.
Office of Health Economics (OHE) health care ex-
penditure data provided the basis for the cost attribute.
Annual healthcare expenditure per person in 2012 was
calculated at circa £2400. Extra money for innovation
implementation was assumed to be increments of the
health care expenditure per person per month: 5% (£10),
10% (£20), 15% (£30), and 20% (£40). The survey implied
that this would be an on-going payment from their tax
paymentsc. Pilot surveys and interviews with health pro-
fessionals confirmed these levels as appropriate.
Experimental design
The experimental design was created using Ngene [47].
It involved obtaining priors from pilot surveysb. For the
pilot surveys, a pivot design, minimising D-error (a
measure of efficiency) was generated using priors of zero
for the marginal utility of all attributes. Choice models
Figure 1 Visual health status scale.
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the marginal utilities. These point estimates and their
standard errors were used as priors in a new Bayesian ef-
ficient design [48] for the main survey. The pilot surveys
ensured the validity of the DCE design before the final
administration.
The final design consisted of five blocks, each having
12 choice tasks. Each respondent was randomly
assigned to a block. For each choice task, respondents
were asked to choose between two hypothetical in-
novation scenarios that they thought the NHS should
prioritise and a ‘none of them’ option. The ‘none of
them’ option is included to reflect real choices and the
consistency with consumer theory. An example choice
task is presented in Figure 2.Data collection
We conducted postal questionnaires with the general pub-
lic in West Yorkshire, UK, in 2011. For model estimation
we used 3,000 observations gathered from a sample of 250
respondentsd, each responded 12 choice tasks. The sample
was randomly selected from the Electoral Register data
and a single NHS Foundation Trust database. We used
stratified random sampling from postcodes for which we
had indices of deprivation and ethnic density.
Most respondents were female (61%), with a mean age
of 50 years, and the majority of them described them-
selves as ‘white’ (87%). Approximately, 30% were retired
and 28% were employed full-time. The 2011 UK census
data suggests that people in our sample were similar to
the West Yorkshire population but a little older than the
Figure 2 An example DCE task.
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retired (West Yorkshire average of 15%).
Model
We used scale-adjusted Latent Class (LC) models to
provide in-depth information on how public preferences
and values attached to innovation options vary with indi-
vidual characteristics.
The underlying theory of the LC models posits that in-
dividuals’ choice behaviour and preferences can be allo-
cated into a set of Q latent classes. Preferences within
each class are assumed to be homogenous, but allowed to
differ across classes. While traditional LC models poten-
tially confound heterogeneity in consumer preferences
and individual differences in error variance [49-51], scale-
adjusted LC choice models separately consider both types
of response heterogeneity by accommodating the possibil-
ity that each latent class may be composed of subsets of
respondents who differ in terms of their level of variance
[52-54]. If this confounding issue is not handled in the
modelling, the predictions obtained may then contain
additional amount of error as well as potential bias [53].
In scale-adjusted LC model it is assumed that within
each latent class there are s classes with different values of
scales. The scale parameter can be explained in terms of
the variance in observed responses. Response variance
within each s class is related to the scale parameter:
σs
2 = π2/6λs
2. This can be interpreted as a measure of ‘un-
certainty’ or ‘lack of certainty’ [52-54]. For respondents
with the scale approaching zero means that the response
variance approaches to infinity, which is considered as
complete uncertainty [53]. The higher the scale gets, the
higher the level of certainty is. Accounting for the scale
heterogeneity within each class, the probability of option i
among J alternatives, chosen by respondent n belonging to
class q, can be expressed in MNL form as the following:Pr ynt ¼ i jclass qð Þ ¼
XS
s¼1
πs
exp λsβqXnit
 
XJ
j¼1 exp λsβqXnjt
 
0
@
1
A
ð1Þ
where πs are the scale membership probabilities within
class q and λ1 is normalised to 1 for identification pur-
poses; βq is a class-specific vector of coefficients for Xnit
characteristics of innovations in choice set tn = 1,…,T.
As individuals make a series of choices, the contribution
of individual i to the likelihood is the joint probability of
the sequence yn = [yn1,…, ynT], becomes the following:
Pynjq ¼
XS
s¼1
πs
YT¼12
t¼1
exp λsβqXnit
 
XJ
j¼1 exp λsβqXnjt
 
0
@
1
A: ð2Þ
The class assignment of the individuals is latent, and is
thus not known to the analyst. However, following Swait
[55] and Boxall and Adamowicz [56], a latent member-
ship likelihood function classifies individuals into one of
the Q segments, with a probability of πn|q. The classifica-
tion variables used in this function can relate to individ-
uals’ characteristics, such as gendere. The choice model
for individual n is then the expectations of the class spe-
cific contributions, which is computed by taking the
product of the joint probability, Pyn|q, and the probability
of class membership, πn|q:
Pyn ¼
XQ
q¼1
πnjq
XS
s¼1
πs
YT¼12
t¼1
exp λsβqXnit
 
XJ
j¼1 exp λsβqXnjt
 
0
@
1
A:
ð3Þ
This model allows us to explain individuals’ choice be-
haviour from their choice attributes and simultaneously
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class membership. We then maximize the log-likelihood
function, ln L ¼
XN
i¼1
Pyn; with respect to the parameters
to be estimated (i.e., βq and latent class parameters) via
Maximum Likelihood estimation, where N is the number
of individuals. The analysis was performed using Latent
GOLD Syntax version 4.5.
As there is no one superior criterion on choosing the
optimum number of latent classes, we considered a num-
ber of factors in deciding the class number. We estimated
models with different classes and used improvements in
values of information criteria –Bayesian Information Cri-
terion (BIC) and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and
log-likelihood values [56,57], and model parsimony as
statistical guidance when comparing the models. Gene-
rally, when the number of classes increases, model fit
gets better, the log-likelihood values increase, and the
information criteria values decrease. When an additional
segment is added to the model, the model fit is penalised
for the increase in the number of parameters due to the
additional segment. The model with additional segment
that is beyond the optimal one may not provide much
improvement.
The public’s valuation of innovation characteristics, i.e.,
marginal willingness to pay (WTP), is then given by
the (negative) ratio of the attribute parameter to the
parameter on the cost of innovations. Because the im-
pact of the attribute is not predetermined, WTP can be
either positive or negative. Negative WTP becomes the
amount they are willing to accept in compensation to
suffer a utility reducing attribute change. For ease of
interpretation we will use the abbreviation WTP, with
the sign of the effect indicating the nature of the im-
pact of the attribute.Results
The results from the analysis of the choice data is pre-
sented in Table 2. As a point of reference our analysis
starts with the standard Multinomial Logit (MNL)
model that assumes homogeneity of preferences and
error variances in our sample. We then analyse prefer-
ence heterogeneity using a scale-adjusted Latent Class
(LC) model, in which we identify three latent classes
and two scale factor levels. A three-class parsimonious
model with two scale levels is preferred for two reasons.
First, adding an additional segment and a scale level be-
yond the preferred levels did not seem to provide much
improvement in the values of information criteria. Second,
when a four-class model is used, more than half of the pa-
rameters in the additional class are not statistically signifi-
cant, indicating that these parameters do not seem to have
significant effect on consumers’ choices.Results of the standard MNL model show that respon-
dents prefer the implementation of innovation options to
a ‘no-innovation’ option. They prefer innovations that are
scientifically proven, targeting young and adults (between
18 and 65), that result in health gains and cost less. They
do, however, vary in their preferences for innovations
aimed at specific population groups: preferring investment
in innovations for people with ‘disability’, ‘cancer’ and
‘asthma’, but not preferring investment in innovations tar-
geting people with ‘drug addiction’ and ‘obesity’.
Moving from the MNL model to the scale-adjusted LC
model shows substantial improvement in the model fit
(around 321 log-likelihood units). This suggests that there
are some people showing different preferences with differ-
ent error variances (or “choice uncertainty”). All else being
equal, Class-1 accounts for the majority of the sample
(54%), Class-2 accounts for 34%, and Class-3 accounts for
12% of the sample. Each latent class is composed of two
consumer subgroups, the first (λ1 = 1) expressing a higher
variance than the other (λ2 = 2.65) and accounts for the
majority of the respondents in each class (65%). Notwith-
standing that the level of “certainty” can be a function of
various things, following the interpretation in Magidson
and Vermunt [53], Flynn et al. [52], and Campbell et al.
[54], we can say that 35% of the respondents have a higher
level of certainty in their choices. Additionally, socio-
economic variables, such as gender, employment status,
education used in the class membership indicate that the
classes are made up of different profiles of respondents.
However, we find no differences in the class memberships
according to respondents’ demographics; thus, we exclude
them from the analysis.
Similar to the MNL results, people in all three classes
prefer innovations that are scientifically proven, have po-
tential health benefits and cost less. However, there are
some important differences. Although the alternative spe-
cific constants (ASC) for the ‘none’ option are negative
and significant for Class-1 and 2 (88% respondents) -
implying these respondents, all else being equal, prefer the
implementation of innovation options - a minority, (12%)
prefers “no-innovation” option. This variation across the
three classes is also reflected in their preferences for inno-
vations targeting different population groups. Whilst all
classes feel the NHS should invest in innovations targeting
people with ‘cancer’ and do not prefer funding innovations
targeting people with ‘drug addictions’, people differ in
their preferences for innovations that target those with
‘disability’, ‘mental health problems’, ‘obesity’ and ‘asthma’.
Class-1 and Class-3 are significantly and positively predis-
posed towards innovations targeting people with ‘disabi-
lity’, Class-2, however, has no significant preferences for
innovations targeting these people. While Class-1 prefers
innovations targeting people with ‘mental health prob-
lems’, Class-2 has indifferent preferences and Class-3 has
Table 2 Analysis results
MNL Scale-adjusted latent class
Parameters Class-1 (54%) Class-2 (34%) Class-3 (12%)
coef. s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
ASC −1.270* 0.076 −1.172* 0.133 −2.146* 0.208 0.549** 0.247
Cost −0.031* 0.002 −0.036* 0.003 −0.036* 0.003 −0.036* 0.003
Target people:
People with disability 0.590* 0.065 0.832* 0.146 0.086 0.084 0.479** 0.225
People with drug addiction −1.570* 0.083 −2.232* 0.231 −0.442* 0.135 −1.775** 0.715
People with cancer 1.560* 0.119 2.017* 0.277 0.645* 0.171 1.706* 0.371
People with mental health problems 0.310* 1.728 0.677* 0.154 −0.070 0.134 −0.622** 0.271
People with obesity −1.150* 0.078 −1.583* 0.161 −0.450* 0.107 0.094 0.276
People with asthma 0.260* 0.085 0.289** 0.120 0.231*** 0.138 0.118 0.256
Target age:
Young (less than 18) 0.090** 0.040 0.175* 0.054 0.036 0.046 −0.422** 0.212
Adults (18–65) 0.180* 0.041 0.274* 0.068 0.071 0.051 −0.175 0.166
Elderly (more than 65) −0.270* 4.300 −0.449* 0.074 −0.107** 0.052 0.597* 0.163
Implementation time:
Between 6–12 months −0.027 0.038 0.027 0.046 −0.075*** 0.042 0.164 0.132
More than 12 months −0.029 0.038 −0.036 0.046 0.015 0.040 −0.254 0.163
Between 0–5 months 0.056 1.604 0.009 0.045 0.060 0.044 0.090 0.123
Whether it works:
It works but not scientifically proven −0.250* 0.041 −0.201* 0.060 −0.194* 0.052 −0.417** 0.164
It works and scientific studies confirm this 0.210 5.612 0.175* 0.046 0.113** 0.045 0.295** 0.125
Experts say it works elsewhere in the NHS 0.040 0.039 0.026 0.051 0.081*** 0.044 0.122 0.131
Potential health benefits:
Moderate health (50%) −0.360 −8.731 −0.283* 0.060 −0.261* 0.056 0.015 0.130
Good health (75%) 0.110* 0.037 0.061 0.041 0.072** 0.037 −0.011 0.122
Best health (100%) 0.250* 0.038 0.222* 0.061 0.189* 0.050 −0.004 0.121
Scale λ1 = 1, λ2 = 2.65 (s.e. = 0.375)
Probabilities
Class size 0.541* 0.040 0.338 0.037* 0.121* 0.026
Scale λ1 0.652* (s.e. = 0.086)
Log-likelihood −2704.018 −2383.155
Pseudo R-squared 0.20 0.39
Number of parameters 15 47
Number of observation 3000 3000
Variables effects-coded. For clarity, we also present the baseline levels, which are arbitrarily chosen. *significant at p < 0.01; **significant at p < 0.05,
***significant at p < 0.10.
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ticularly has no significantly different preferences for
spending on innovations targeting people with ‘obe-
sity’; Class-1 and Class-2, however, are significantly
and negatively orientated towards innovations target-
ing obesity. As for the innovations targeting people
with ‘asthma’, while Class-1 shows significant and posi-
tive preferences for such innovations, Class-2 andClass-3 show no significant preferences for innovations
targeting these people.
Preferences for innovations targeting different age
groups also vary at each class. While Class-1 prefers in-
novations targeting adults the most, followed by young
people relative to elderly, Class-2 and Class-3 hold dif-
ferent preferences: Class-2 does not prefer innovations
targeting elderly and is indifferent between other age
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young people.
The results also showed that the respondents do not
differ on their valuation of the speed of implementation;
they are all indifferent between different implementation
times. When it comes to uncertainty surrounding the
likely effect of an innovation, all respondents value inno-
vations back by scientific studies (with significant nega-
tive preferences for innovations not scientifically
proven). Only Class-2 shows significant positive prefer-
ences towards expert opinions.
As for the potential health benefits of innovations, all
else being equal, the majority of the sample (i.e., Class1
and Class-2) prefer improvement from a worst health to
the good health (75%), but do not prefer having a mod-
erate health (50%) gain. Only Class-3, 16% of the sample,
is indifferent in the levels of health benefits. To further
develop our understanding of respondents’ preferences
we calculate their valuations of innovation characteris-
tics (i.e., WTPs), which allows for comparisons of their
preferences within and between classes.Willingness–to-pay (WTP) estimates
Table 3 compares the marginal WTP results derived
under the two models, using the ratios − β^k=β^cost
 
: As
can be seen, the public’s valuations of innovation charac-
teristics are aligned with their preferences. Irrespective
of the model assumption shown in Table 2, respondents
are willing to pay most for innovations that are scientif-
ically proven, have at least moderate health benefit, take
less time to implement, and target adults and the young.
Comparing the marginal WTP estimates obtained from
the MNL and the weighted average of scale-adjusted LC
model, with respect to their baselines, reveal some signifi-
cant differences between the respondents’ valuations of in-
novations targeting people with obesity [p-value = 0.026]
and innovations resulting in ‘good’ [p-value =0.007] and
‘best possible’ health gains [p-value =0.005].
The marginal WTP of respondents in the three classes
also show some variations. Relative to the people with
‘mental health problems’, all classes are, on average, will-
ing to pay for innovations targeting cancer patients.
While Class-3, on average, shows the highest marginal
WTP for this group (c.£65), Class-2 shows the lowest
WTP (c.£20). The marginal WTP values for innovations
targeting ‘drug users’ also show difference across classes:
while Class-2 and Class-3 are indifferent in their WTP
for innovation targeting ‘drug users’ with respect to the
mental health patients, Class-1 is willing to pay less for
innovations targeting this group. Another interesting re-
sult is the respondents’ valuation of innovations mostly
designed for people with obesity. While the smallest
class, Class-3 does not value innovations targetingpeople with obesity significantly different from the one
for mental health patients, Class-1 and Class-2, all else
being equal, show negative preferences and WTP for
these innovations targeting people with obesity. This
issue aside, we note that the confidence intervals for all
attributes in Class-3 are generally wider than other clas-
ses, which would imply that the marginal WTP esti-
mates for Class-3 are less precisely estimated compared
to other classes.
The sample also shows variations in marginal WTP for
‘target age’: Class-2 is indifferent in their WTP for
innovation targeting adult and young people with respect
to elderly, Class-3 is not willing to pay for innovations tar-
geting these two groups. As for the implementation time,
people in all classes do not show significant difference in
their WTP with respect to the quickest implementation
time. The strength of the evidence behind innovations is
also valued differently. Relative to those underpinned by
scientific studies, respondents in all classes are not willing
to pay for innovations that are not scientifically proven.
Expert opinion is not valued positively in Class-1, but val-
ued not significantly differently from the scientific studies
in Class-2 and Class-3. As for the valuation of potential
health gain, higher expected health benefits from an
innovation result in higher marginal WTP. While Class-1
and Class-2 are willing to pay not significantly differently
for health gains, Class-3 seems to have indifferent prefer-
ences for the level of potential health gain with respect to
the baseline level.
Scenario analysis
For ease of interpretation of the results, we explore
choice probabilities for different policy options in this
scenario analysis. This analysis uses the parameter esti-
mates reported in Table 2 to assess choice predictions
under the scale-adjusted latent Class models. For ease of
comparison, the choice prediction estimates have been
weighted according to the unconditional class member-
ship and scale probabilities. For this analysis, we compare
a “no investment” policy option against four different
hypothetical policy options presented in Table 4 where we
also showed the choice predictions. In this analysis, for
simplicity, we assume that these are the only available
policy options to the decision-maker. Of course, there
are a large number of possible policy options that can
be compared.
The first policy option targets elderly cancer patients,
takes more than a year to implement, result in moderate
health gain (50%), had expert consultation, and costs as
high as £40 per month from individuals’ tax paymentsc.
The second policy option targets young people with
drug addiction, has quickest implementation time, scien-
tifically proven, results in the best health gain, and costs
quarter of the Policy 1 (i.e., £10) per month. Third policy
Table 3 Marginal WTP estimates (£/month)
MNL Class-1 (54%) Class-2 (34%) Class-3 (12%) Weighted average
Target people: 9.31 (1.84 – 16.79) 4.28 (−6.53 – 15.09) 4.31 (−5.22 – 13.85) 30.41 (10.86 – 49.96) 7.46 (0.61 – 14.31)
People with disability
People with drug addiction −61.01 (−69.38 – -52.64) −80.38 (−96.12 – -64.64) −10.25 (−21.97 – 1.46) −31.86 (−76.58 – 12.87) −50.82 (−60.60 – -41.03)
People with cancer 40.77 (32.06 – 49.48) 37.00 (18.49 – 55.51) 19.77 (8.20 – 31.34) 64.29 (38.51 – 90.07) 34.49 (23.72 – 45.26)
People with mental health problems Baseline level
People with obesity −47.28 (−55.43 – -39.13) −62.43 (−73.46 – -51.40) −10.49 (−20.92 – -0.07) 19.76 (−1.90 – 41.42) −34.93 (−42.00 – -27.85)
People with asthma −1.51 (−9.83 – 6.81) −10.74 (−20.04 – -1.44) 8.32 (−3.49 – 20.13) 20.42 (0.58 – 40.26) −0.53 (−7.19 – 6.14)
Target age:
Young (less than 18) 11.61 (7.16 – 16.06) 17.22 (11.24 – 23.20) 3.92 (−0.61 – 8.45) −28.11 (−46.48 – -9.74) 7.23 (3.27 – 11.19)
Adults (18–65) 14.41 (9.82 – 18.99) 19.94 (12.82 – 27.07) 4.90 (−0.10 – 9.89) −21.30 (−34.94 – -7.65) 9.86 (5.57 – 14.15)
Elderly (more than 65) Baseline level
Implementation time:
Between 6–12 months −2.69 (−6.81 – 1.44) 0.48 (−3.71 – 4.68) −3.76 (−7.92 – 0.40) 2.05 (−8.67 – 12.77) −0.76 (−3.61 – 2.09)
More than 12 months −2.76 (−6.88 – 1.37) −1.24 (−5.43 – 2.96) −1.28 (−5.10 – 2.55) −9.51 (−23.37 – 4.36) −2.25 (−5.18 – 0.67)
Between 0–5 months Baseline level
Whether it works:
It works but not scientifically proven −14.66 (−18.88 – -10.44) −10.41 (−15.52 – -5.30) −8.49 (−13.18 – -3.80) −19.68 (−33.83 – -5.53) −10.89 (−14.63 – -7.14)
Experts say it works elsewhere in the NHS −1.65 (−16.82 – 13.51) −4.14 (−8.20 – -0.09) −0.91 (−4.77 – 2.96) −4.79 (−15.39 – 5.81) −3.13 (−5.85 – -0.41)
It works and scientific studies confirm this Baseline level
Potential health benefits:
Moderate health (50%) Baseline level
Good health (75%) 15.45 (11.09 – 19.82) 9.51 (5.02 – 14.01) 9.20 (4.83 – 13.56) −0.71 (−12.31 – 10.89) 8.17 (5.10 – 11.24)
Best health (100%) 20.11 (15.61 – 24.61) 13.94 (7.79 – 20.09) 12.44 (7.08 – 17.80) −0.53 (−12.90 – 11.84) 11.68 (7.87 – 15.49)
Figures in parentheses are confidence intervals at the 95% level, obtained using the delta method. Baseline levels are chosen arbitrarily.
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Table 4 Choice predictions
Policy 1 Policy 2 Policy 3 Policy 4
Target people:
People with disability ✓
People with drug addiction ✓
People with cancer ✓
People with mental health problems ✓
People with obesity
People with asthma
Target age:
Young (less than 18) ✓
Adults (18–65) ✓ ✓
Elderly (more than 65) ✓
Implementation time:
Between 6–12 months ✓
More than 12 months ✓
Between 0–5 months ✓ ✓
Whether it works:
It works but not scientifically proven
Experts say it works elsewhere in the NHS ✓
It works and scientific studies confirm this ✓ ✓ ✓
Potential health benefits:
Moderate health (50%) ✓
Good health (75%) ✓
Best health (100%) ✓ ✓
Cost per month: £40 £10 £30 £15
Choice probability 0.78 (0.69-0.87) 0.43 (0.39-0.48) 0.79 (0.75-0.83) 0.82 (0.80-0.84)
Figures in parentheses are confidence intervals at the 95% level, obtained using the delta method.
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/14/360involves investing in an innovation aiming adult popula-
tion with disability. It has similarities to the Policy 2: sci-
entifically proven and has quickest implementation time.
It, however, results in less health gain as compared to
the Policy 2 and costs three times more (i.e., £30). The
last policy option, the Policy 4, is benefiting adults with
mental health problems, takes 6–12 months to take in
place in the NHS, confirmed by scientific studies, and
results in moderate health gain. This policy requires £15
per month from individuals’ tax contributions.
The results of the scenario analysis reveals that irre-
spective of the policy option assumptions respondents
would prefer the hypothetical innovations to be imple-
mented over the ‘no investment’ options. In particular,
respondents are more likely to choose the Policy 4,
followed by the Policy 3, Policy 1, and Policy 2. Although
‘cancer’ is being the most prioritised target group, as
shown in the results in Table 2, in this hypothetical sce-
nario analysis, innovation targeting cancer patients in
Policy 1 is not the most desired option. Similarly, al-
though the Policy 2 results in better health gain, quickerimplementation time with less uncertainty around its ef-
fects and costs less than other policy options, it is the
least preferred policy scenario. On the other hand, Policy
4 that has more health gain, longer implantation time
with half the cost of Policy 3 is the most likely to be
chosen. As illustrated in this analysis, weights given to
the importance of policy features and how respondents
make trade-offs between them affect their acceptability.
Discussion
Prioritising scarce resources for investment in innovation
in publically funded health systems is unavoidable.
Many healthcare systems wish to foster transparency
and accountability in the decisions they make by incorp-
orating the public in decision-making processes. This
paper presents a unique conceptual approach exploring
the public’s preferences for health service innovations.
It involves viewing healthcare innovations as ‘bundles’
of characteristics, rather than dealing with specific inno-
vations in isolation, such as new ways of ‘Chlamydia
screening’ or developing new ‘orthopaedic services’.
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their-parts’, allows policy-makers to compare numerous
competing health service innovations without repeatedly
administering surveys for each specific innovation choice.
Methodologically, the research shows how the use of
DCE technique, when combined with scale-adjusted LC
models explains heterogeneity in public preferences and
willingness to pay for health service innovations. To our
knowledge, this is the first study to quantify the public’
preferences for health service innovations, described
broadly, using a DCE technique with a scale-adjusted LC
analysis approach.
The estimation results revealed heterogeneity in re-
spondents’ preferences and WTP for health service in-
novations. We identified three consumer classes who
could be described as ‘concerned’ about spending tax in-
come on certain innovations. Each latent class is also
composed of two consumer subgroups having different
scale (error variance). This is also referred to as “cer-
tainty” [52-54]. According to the results, we found that
35% of the respondents have a higher level of certainty
in their choices.
Although there were important differences in prefer-
ences for health service innovation investment choices,
people in each class, in general, preferred the funds to
be spent on innovations that are scientifically proven,
have potential health benefits, take less time to imple-
ment, and cost less. The research, however, highlighted
the contentious nature of policy decision criteria such as
‘age’ [11,58,59] and ‘targeting particular populations’
[11,34,60]. In the UK, NICEdoes not promote age as a
de facto basis for priority setting [61]. However, some re-
searchers (e.g., Roberts et al. [62]) have described ‘age
discrimination’ in local services. Our findings are mixed,
as it is found in the literature. While the majority of the
respondents preferred innovations targeting ‘young’ or
‘adults’, a minority (12%) preferred targeting the ‘elderly’.
Given we observed no significant differences between
classes in terms of respondents’ ages or gender, this fin-
ding is interesting. A number of empirical studies also
found a lower priority afforded to older people [34,63-65].
Kappel and Sondøe [33] argue that, other things being
equal, young people should be prioritised in distributing
limited resources; “either because resources will generally
be more useful when given to young people, or because
they have lived less life and therefore ‘deserve’ the health
improvement [11], p.201]” - a so-called ‘fair innings’ argu-
ment. Lewis and Charny [66], found a similar picture.
They asked respondents to choose between two people
alike in all respects other than age, for a treatment. They
found that the respondents had a very strong preference
for 5 year olds over 70 year olds, and a strong preference
for 35 years old over 60 years old. A qualitative analysis by
Schwappach et al. also found “moderate evidence that thepublic tends to favour the young over the elderly in
health-care allocation, although the existence and strength
of these preferences varies across countries, study designs
and context of questions” [59], p.212].
Conversely, other studies have found significant sup-
port for the idea of treating people of all ages equally
[67-69], as we found in the latent Class-2 for adult and
young people, which was 34% of our sample. Anand and
Wailo [67] asked 144 people in Leicestershire, UK to
consider how limited NHS funds should be allocated be-
tween two types of patients differing only in age. They
first asked respondents to choose between groups where
age differences were large (80 versus 40), and then grad-
ually decreased the differential until groups differed by
one year (41 versus 40). Respondents rejected the use
age as a rationing device, even with large differences be-
tween age groups and, therefore, large differences in po-
tential health life years saved (or lost).
Different health issues differentially impact on specific
populations. Our sample provides evidence of different
desires to invest in innovations targeting specific groups,
such as people with cancer, disability, drug addiction, or
obesity. Three distinct views emerged but in general re-
spondents preferred spending on people with cancer and
did not prefer pending on ‘unpopular’ groups, such as
people with drug addiction and obesity. In qualitative re-
sponses in the survey some individuals took the stance
that drug addiction or obesity was self-induced and
therefore should be given lower priority. Others have
found similar results [34,42,60,66]. Crisp et al. [70], in a
UK-based survey, found that their sample viewed drug
addiction and alcoholism most negatively and frequently
believed people with drug addiction or alcoholism be
responsible for their disorders. A telephone survey
study by Schomerus et al. conducted with 1012 people
in Germany showed that, “perceived personal responsi-
bility exerted significant influence on resource alloca-
tion decisions: the less personally responsible sufferers
were regarded to be for their alcoholism, the more
likely resources for alcoholism were chosen not to be
cut [71], p.208]”.
Our study provides policy-makers with the public’s
valuation of (and acceptability of) various healthcare
innovation scenarios. Importantly, we do this by trading
off clear and explicit criteria rather than opaque criteria
or procedures [72-74]. The marginal utilities allow us to
calculate the overall value attached to competing
innovation options and choose the one that the public
values the most. Our scenario analysis presented com-
parisons of a number of hypothetical policy options that
involve investment in health service innovations.
Commensurate with its exploratory stage of develop-
ment, our study has some limitations. Notwithstanding
the use of pilot surveys and focus group discussions our
Erdem and Thompson BMC Health Services Research 2014, 14:360 Page 12 of 14
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/14/360questionnaire was limited by the range of characteristics
used. We did not for example look at ‘sustainability’ or
‘ease of use of potential innovations’. In defence, we
present three main reasons for limiting the characteristics
used. First, when a large number of attributes is used in a
choice experiment, individuals may tend to use heuristics
or lexicographic decision rules, rather than trading-off
characteristics [23]. Second, when the number of attri-
butes increases in DCE, the number of choice sets that
need to be presented to respondents also increases. Too
many choices may impose too high a cognitive burden for
respondents. Third, the focus group discussions and inter-
views with managers from an NHS Foundation Trust
helped us in the final selection of attributes that are
deemed to be realistic, applicable to a wider range of
innovation options, and consistent with decision criteria
used at NHS. Future studies, however, should take into ac-
count the characteristics that were not included in the
study to give a fuller picture. The other limitation is that
whilst the sample was reasonably representative of the
general population (West Yorkshire), the average age was
slightly higher than the regional average. Future research
will focus on recruiting younger people who are less well
represented in this study. Finally, we acknowledge that
our relatively small sample prohibits the generalising from
our findings to the wider population, and thus requires
careful attention in the interpretation of the results. Fu-
ture research should consider looking at these issues while
increasing the sample size.
Conclusions
Discrete choice approaches can help policy makers,
those designing innovations, and decision-makers in
health services make more of the public’s views on how
services invest their money. This study presents an ap-
plication of DCE and scale-adjusted latent class model-
ling that explores the general public’s preferences for
health service innovations and how these preferences
vary. The methods and findings shed light onto the ways
public preferences can be used by policy-makers to sup-
port their decision-making and ultimately help make the
process of deciding ‘who gets what’ more visible and
open to challenge.
Consent
Return of the completed questionnaires from the general
public was taken as implying consent for the publication
of this report and any accompanying images.
Endnotes
aThe focus group was formed by invitation and involved
one-time interview that lasted about two hours. Overall
fifteen people were invited via email to participate in the
study. Our aim in this purposive sampling was not torecruit a representative sample, but to identify inductively
a list of innovation characteristics before interviewing
members of the public in a conventionally generalizable,
probabilistic, way using conjoint surveys.
bOur initial pilot involved 60 people from a range of
demographic categories and occupations at the Univer-
sity of York. The pilot yielded data that could be used to
identify confusions, lack of understanding, and the time
needed to complete the survey. After this first pilot, we
formally piloted the survey with 50 people from the gen-
eral public, NHS managers, and patient panel members
of the Bradford Institute for Health Research and NHS
Foundation Trust to revise some of the descriptions and
modes of presentation used in the questionnaires.
cWe note that asking a monthly fee may artificially in-
flate the WTP values, as compared to asking either a
one-off or annual sums [75].
dThe response rate was 20%, which is higher than the
survey rate of NHS Foundation Trust that was con-
ducted in the region for another health context looking
for the general public’s views about health services.
During administration of questionnaires we did not have
any major issues. We excluded 18 questionnaires (3%)
from the analysis as they were either completely empty or
only responded to a few demographic questions.
eWhen block designs used, it is possible to observe
one or more of the latent classes to be driven by a par-
ticular block. In order to see if this is the case in this
particular study, we included ‘blocks’ as a predictor in
the Latent Class model. As a result of the analysis, we
did not observe any statistically significant ‘blocks’ effect,
and thus conclude that the latent classes are not driven by
a particular experimental design block, but by preferences.
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